The Supreme Court has developed a robust equal protection
INTRODUCTION
When will the law deem someone a victim of race discrimination? Traditionally, the answer was different treatment that caused substantive harm.
1 This Article calls this "substantive discrimination." For example, the Supreme Court doomed the state statutes challenged in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) not only because they assigned the plaintiffs to schools because of their "Negro" race (a process harm), but also because that race-based assignment produced other harms (substantive ones). 2 The Warren Court contextualized the process harm in its substantive effects: the "feeling of inferiority" created by de jure segregation, the inequality inherent in separate education, and the importance of education, which is "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." discriminatory under the reasoning of Parents Involved. Likewise, the question in Fisher is now whether Ms. Fisher was treated differently during the admissions process-not whether she would have been admitted if she were African-American or Latino. 15 The Roberts Court was able to make this change to how it conceptualizes discrimination, in part, because Parents Involved is neither a school desegregation case nor an affirmative action case. It occupies a new space in our so-called post-racial society. 16 The difficulty with the hypothetical Latino employee is causation and damages. What exactly are the damages caused by the ethnically hostile statement? This Article explores how the process discrimination recognized in Parents Involved affects these questions of causation and injury in traditional discrimination cases. This Article argues that the Court's adoption of process discrimination in reverse discrimination cases expands the definition of discriminatory injury, and that minority plaintiffs should use that definition-if the remedy is carefully crafted.
This argument proceeds in three parts. Part I reveals how the Supreme Court created process-only discrimination in Parents Involved. This Article argues that the Supreme Court devised an unconditional version of colorblind jurisprudence to expand constitutional injury to include any different treatment, including process-only claims. Part I ends with exploring how this enables white plaintiffs to win their reverse discrimination cases. Specifically, this Article predicts that Ms. Fisher will one day win her case against the University of Texas, even if she would not have been admitted if she were African-American or Latino. 17 Part II turns to the effect of the expanded definition of constitutional injury on claims by minority plaintiffs. It focuses on the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, which is a key component of any discrimination claim. The expanded definition of injury will make some aspects of discriminatory intent easier to prove for minority plaintiffs. Yet, even after Parents Involved, nonwhite plaintiffs will still struggle to demonstrate discriminatory intent.
Part III argues that the process discrimination found in Parents Involved is at odds with at least three principles concerning what counts as a discrimination injury-the racial harassment definition, stray remarks doctrine, and same decision defense. All three principles permit certain 15 . See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 16. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (defining "postracialism" as "a twenty-first-century ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt racebased remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social action"); infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
17. instances of explicitly racial conduct and are inconsistent with Parents Involved's command of absolute color blindness. Lastly, this Part recognizes that process-only injuries will likely result in more limited, but still valuable, remedies.
I. PARENTS INVOLVED'S DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION
This Part describes how Parents Involved reveals the Roberts Court's adoption of process-only discrimination. 18 That approach differs from how the Rehnquist Court defined discrimination, 19 and greatly eases the way for white plaintiffs to contest race-conscious governmental activity. 20 Lastly, this Article explains why Ms. Fisher should win her claim of race discrimination against the University of Texas and how the 2013 opinion in Fisher helps actualize Parents Involved's concept of discrimination.
A. Parents Involved and Process Discrimination
Parents Involved addressed the constitutionality of student assignment policies at two school districts-one in Louisville, Kentucky and the other in Seattle, Washington. 21 The litigation followed Grutter v. Bollinger, where the Supreme Court allowed race conscious student admissions to achieve student diversity in the higher education setting. 22 
The Plans and Their Unconstitutionality
The two school districts voluntarily turned to a popular educational reform effort, parental choice, to redress an almost timeless situationsegregated schools. 23 The problem, declared the Supreme Court, was that the school districts controlled parental choice by a variety of factors, one of which was race. 24 Public schools in Jefferson County (Louisville), Kentucky required that parental applications for enrollment be processed so that all non-magnet schools would be between fifteen and fifty percent black in student population. 25 Seattle, Washington schools mandated that applications for ninth grade be granted so that student enrollment in all high schools would 18 be within ten or fifteen percentage points of the school district's white and nonwhite high school population.
26
A five-Justice majority held the plans unconstitutional in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts. 27 Justice Anthony Kennedy did not join two parts of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, thereby making those portions a plurality opinion. 28 Justice Kennedy also wrote his own concurring opinion. 29 Critically, race was a factor in the plans, but not the only factor. Chief Justice Roberts overstated his case when he, in the opening paragraph of his majority opinion, wrote that student assignment for the plaintiffs was "solely because of their race." 30 The word "solely" would be fair in the context of the de jure segregation challenged in Brown, but not in twentyfirst century Louisville and Seattle.
No student in Parents Involved was assigned solely because of race. Assignment was based on a variety of factors. Parental choice was given the most weight. 31 Race was a deciding factor for a small percentage of students, 32 but only after parental choice, sibling placement, and home address narrowed the options for the student. 33 Race was certainly part of the process, and a few times a tiebreaker, but race alone did not determine assignment like it did in de jure segregation.
The Court criticized both school districts' rough racial classifications. 32. Specifically in Seattle, 307 students "were affected by the racial tiebreaker." Id. at 733. Yet, the Supreme Court concluded that "only 52 students . . . were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned." Id. at 734. The Court noted that in Jefferson County, "the racial guidelines account [ed] for only 3 percent of assignments." Id. Interestingly, the small number of students affected indicated the lack of necessity for the plans. Id. at 728. Justice Kennedy emphasized this as well in his concurring opinion. Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (" [T] he small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through different means.").
33. Seattle's plan included a preference for siblings, for geographic proximity between a student's home and school, and for geographic proximity to child care. Id. at 711-12 (majority opinion); id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Louisville classified students as either black or nonblack, and Seattle designated students as white or nonwhite. 35 Perhaps the most damning fact was Seattle's policy that a high school with a half white and half AsianAmerican student population would meet its racial classifications, but not a school with roughly a quarter each of African-American, Asian-American, Latino, and white students.
36
In this respect, the school districts made it easy to criticize their programs for the lack of nuance present in the University of Michigan Law School program upheld in Grutter. Both school districts used race in a less sophisticated manner than a law school program devised by law professors who anticipated litigation. 37 In Louisville and Seattle, however, the lower courts upheld the constitutionality of the plans under Grutter. 
Grutter and Gratz
Grutter and Gratz provide the starting point for evaluating the constitutionality of the school districts' student assignment plans in 36. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724; see also id. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding that the Seattle School District "has failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students classified as 'white,' it has employed the crude racial categories of 'white' and 'non-white' as the basis for its assignment decisions"). Overall, Seattle had 23.8% Asian-American, 23.1% African-American, and 10.3% Latino student populations. Id. at 712 n.2 (majority opinion). However, Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that Seattle was discontinuing this approach. Id. at 854 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Parents Involved. 39 The Supreme Court in Gratz declared that the University of Michigan undergraduate admissions system of awarding an additional twenty points to underrepresented minority applicants was unconstitutional. 40 That automatic, numerical approach was not narrowly tailored to the compelling governmental interest of diversity.
41
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor agreed with the outcome in Gratz, 42 but then switched sides to give the deciding fifth vote to uphold the University of Michigan Law School's more nuanced, flexible admissions system in Grutter. 43 She emphasized the individual review in the law school's practices and the absence of any fixed numerical goals in the law school's quest for a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students.
44 Schools wishing to consider race in student admissions or assignment thus must create a system free of the fault of Gratz and consistent with the individual review in Grutter.
Yet, navigating the differences between Grutter and Gratz is difficult. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in part from Grutter because of the ambiguity created by what he called the "split double header" of Grutter and Gratz. 45 Even more troubling, the dissenting Justices in Grutter found no meaningful difference between the law school's plan and the undergraduate's approach. 46 In practice, the dissenting Justices declared, Grutter was like Gratz. 47 The line separating the two Michigan cases is, at he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.").
45. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A split double header occurs in baseball, when teams play each other in back to back games and each team wins one game.
46. The dissenting Justices argued that this lack of a meaningful difference was mainly indicated by the pattern of admitting about the same number of African-American, Hispanic, and Native American students each year and by defining the quest for critical mass differently for each minority group. Id. at 346-48 (agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist that "[t]he admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions"); id. at 385-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School's admissions program that the Court finds appealing appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed program designed to ensure proportionate representation of applications from selected minority groups.") (citation omitted); id. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist and adding that "[t]he consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual review save for race itself").
47. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas also argued that the law school's quest for diversity operated as a "quota." See id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ( What is clear, however, is that Gratz prohibits awarding specific points to some races but not others. 49 The plans under attack in Parents Involved avoided this pitfall. First, all races and ethnicities were subject to and affected by the mandated percentages 50 -all races had applications granted and denied because of the school districts' defined goals. Second, the school districts' mandated percentages in Parents Involved were more like Grutter's critical mass quest than Gratz's automatic twenty-point scoring. 51 The school districts in Louisville and Seattle adopted a mandated [I] t is undisputed that the race-based tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit one race or group to the detriment of another. At some schools, white students are given preference over nonwhite students, and, at other schools, nonwhite students are given preference over white students."); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861 ("[T]he 2001 Plan uses race in a manner calculated not to harm any particular person because of his or her race. Certainly, no student is directly denied a benefit because of race so that another of a different race can receive that benefit. Rather, the Board uses race in a limited way to achieve benefits for all students through its integrated schools."); Parents Involved I, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("The program at issue here falls indiscriminately on whites and nonwhites alike, ensuring a racially integrated system for the benefit of the school district as a whole. Even while the program allows minority students access to Ballard and Hale, Seattle's popular predominantly white schools, it also allows white students access to Franklin, the city's popular predominantly minority school. It is in this sense, too, that the program is not a 'preference.'" (emphasis omitted)), aff ' percentage, but it was flexible-Louisville had a thirty-five percent band and Seattle had a twenty to thirty percent band. 52 The numerical bands in Parents Involved thus were more like the law school's quest for the enrollment of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities: an attention to numbers, but numbers devoid of any absolute quality. 53 An even more fundamental difference, however, exists. Gratz and Grutter involved traditional affirmative action plans, while Parents Involved did not. In Gratz and Grutter, identified races received a benefit in a merit-based system. 54 Contrarily, merit was completely absent from the student assignment plans in Parents Involved. Also, no race received a preference in the Parents Involved plans-all races were treated equally. The mandated percentages affected both whites and nonwhites. 55 Clearly, Parents Involved is not an affirmative action case.
Neither is Parents Involved a school desegregation case, despite Chief Justice Roberts's efforts to equate the school districts' plans with de jure segregation. 56 School segregation depends on the intent to create separate schools and creates a constitutional duty to desegregate. 57 The school districts in Parents Involved sought to promote racial diversity, not segregate. Thus, their use of race did not create a duty to desegregate, which is the most elemental part of school desegregation litigation.
58
Parents Involved is a post-school desegregation case that is not affirmative action in disguise. It occupies a different space. 59 That space created room for the Roberts Court to both restrict Grutter (after all, the Grutter dissenting Justices are now in the majority) and create a new concept of what it means to discriminate, what this Article calls "process by reference to the substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce, including cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes."), with Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (holding that assigning twenty points to all applicants from underrepresented minority groups is unconstitutional).
52. Defining discrimination solely by the process of considering race began in Parents Involved. As explained in this section, the Court focused entirely on the need for race-free individual treatment, with no attention to any independent substantive harm. Racial attentiveness in the student assignment process completed the constitutional injury.
Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis in Parents Involved by mischaracterizing the challenged plans as treating race as the factor driving assignment decisions. 61 As explained earlier, race is clearly a factor, but it is unfair to describe the plans as akin to de jure segregation where race truly was the only factor in student assignment.
62
Chief Justice Roberts then faulted the plans for their lack of individual review, 63 when student assignment plans by definition are never about individual review. 64 Student assignment plans treat groups of students (those in particular attendance zones or those with siblings in the school, for example) the same. Yet, the lack of individual review drove all aspects of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion.
To hold the policies unconstitutional, Chief Justice Roberts also had to reconfigure Grutter. (2013) . The Grutter Court also emphasized that the Rehnquist Court engaged in a cost-benefit balancing that preferred the societal benefits of the law school's program over the individual harm to Ms. Grutter. 68 The Court in Grutter found that the many benefits of the diversity policy were worth the costs of the explicit use of race in student admissions. The Court did not mention, however, any of those values in its Parents Involved opinion. Instead, it falsely reduced Grutter to being just about individual treatment.
The opinion is also notable for what it ignores. First, the process did not affect any race differently; all races had applications denied and granted after the racial factor was applied. 69 Many would count this as equal protection under the laws. 70 The Roberts Court refused, however, to equate that with equal treatment.
Second, the majority was perfectly content that the plaintiffs did not allege any specific harm from having to attend their assigned school instead of their preferred school. 71 The Supreme Court in Brown faulted the inequality inherent in segregated education, but none of the parties in Parents Involved even suggested inequality. 72 The presumption was that the schools were entirely equal, except that some of the schools were sometimes oversubscribed. program offered at an oversubscribed school. 74 Yet, no federal right to a particular educational program exists outside of special education or bilingual education; nor do students have the right to attend their nearest school. 75 In fact, the opposite is true: local school districts have the right to require attendance at an assigned school. 76 The school districts are not obligated to provide any choice at all. Instead, the Court has a long tradition of deferring to local educators in the name of "local control." 77 Third, the plaintiffs actually suffered no harm other than racial attentiveness in a multifaceted student assignment process. The Roberts Court said nothing of damage to the hearts and minds of affected students. 78 Nor could it be said that any stigma attached to a non-meritbased decision. Parental disappointment in their children's school assignment was only personal disappointment; the student assignment itself was not a constitutional injury. In short, the only constitutional injury was racial considerations in student assignment. 78. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d at 1181 (noting the absence of stigma because "no assignment to any of the District's high schools is tethered to a student's qualifications"); id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("That a student is denied the school of his choice may be disappointing, but it carries no racial stigma and says nothing at all about that individual's aptitude or ability."); see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Because transfers under the Lynn Plan are not tied to merit, the Plan's use of race does not risk imposing stigmatic harm . . . .").
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Consequently a minority group of white parents can trump the majority's will (as reflected in a popularly elected school board) on the distribution of public goods-without showing that denying the white parents their personal preference even resulted in a harmful distribution of public goods on an individual level. As Professor Girardeau A. Spann aptly described it, "[D]isappointed white parents, therefore, were sacrificing the inclusionary educational interests of minority school children in order to advance exclusionary educational interests of their own." 79 The Roberts Court was willing to take this step because it wanted to scrub any and all race consciousness from government decision making. The majority evidenced a concern with the continuing consideration of race; it sought to eradicate it completely from government decision making 80 -no matter what the cost to society or other constitutional values such as local control over schools. 81 A plurality of Justices, over the objection of Justice Kennedy and the dissenting Justices, went so far as to remake the iconic Brown v. Board of Education in this image of racial neutrality, as the next subsection explores.
Brown v. Board of Education
The Roberts Court in Parents Involved did more than hold the challenged plans unconstitutional. A plurality of Justices was bold enough to declare that Brown v. Board of Education mandated that outcome.
82
That is, according to the Parents Involved plurality, the Louisville and Seattle school districts engaged in the exact same harm as the Brown defendants. 83 At the end of its opinion, the plurality then declared, "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 85 In doing so, the Parents Involved plurality reduced Brown to one value: no race-based decision making.
While debates about the "true" meaning of Brown abound, 86 few outside the 1950s and 1960s South have argued that Brown only required racial neutrality-that is, no one until Chief Justice Roberts. 87 To say that Brown required only racially neutral student assignment ignores the most memorable line from Brown that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
88 It also ignores the long-standing constitutional duty to change racially explicit laws and desegregate schools "root and branch."
89 Not surprisingly, many have protested the plurality's use of Brown.
90
The plurality's treatment of Brown is also quite different from that of its predecessor Court. The Rehnquist Court, while recognizing that school desegregation remedies must be tempered by practicality, affirmed that Brown's promise was not just to end racial barriers to enrollment, but also to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimination. 91 The Rehnquist diversity for the benefit of minority students mirrors segregationists' previous arguments that segregation was used for the benefit of minority students. See id. at 2428 ("There is no principled distinction between the University's assertion that diversity yields educational benefits and the segregationists' assertion that segregation yielded those same benefits." Justice Kennedy joined most of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion, but not all. He rejected the plurality's reaction to the school districts' racial justifications: "The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race."
93 He also chastised the plurality for its treatment of Brown.
94 Instead, Justice Kennedy clearly supported diversity in the classroom for both kindergartners and law students. 95 He would allow "race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way," such as by influencing where new schools are constructed and how student attendance zones are configured.
96
Justice Kennedy did not, however, fault the majority for finding discrimination only from the process of racial attentiveness without proof of any other harm. He joined Chief Justice Roberts in this regard. Justice Kennedy had the utmost concern for individual treatment, even with his support for diversity. If the two cannot coexist, Justice Kennedy would prefer race-neutral individual treatment over diversity, just as he did in Ricci and Grutter. 97 The same is also true of his opinion in Fisher, where he emphasized the need for rigorous narrow tailoring analysis. 98 Kennedy apparently supports diversity in theory, but he finds it too distasteful in practice. 99 He has yet to find a race-conscious program he supports.
B. A Change in Defining Discrimination
Parents Involved reconceptualized more than the meaning of discrimination and Brown. It also advocated a more rigorous version of color-blind jurisprudence than the Rehnquist Court.
The Rehnquist Court's Color-Blind Jurisprudence
Defining race discrimination exclusively by the process of considering race, as reflected in the opinions of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, signals a foundational shift in how discrimination is conceptualized. The Rehnquist Court, like the Roberts Court, also found whites to be discriminated on the basis of their race. 100 In doing so, it moved the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause toward a more color-blind jurisprudence.
101 That is, the Rehnquist Court sought race neutrality over race-conscious behavior, and believed awarding benefits on the basis of race was just as wrong as withholding benefits on the basis of race.
102 Yet, its concept of discrimination included a substantive component that identified societal and individual harms arising from different treatment.
103
For example, the Rehnquist Court often ruled against racial decision making because such an approach would foster harmful stereotypes. he Law School's admissions policy . . . helps to break down racial stereotypes . . . ."); id at 333 ("To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students."); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("But to the extent that race is used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation."); id. at 985 ("Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes."); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229
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(Interestingly, the Rehnquist Court itself engaged in racial stereotyping at times.
105
) It also expressed strong concern with racial preferences engendering racial hostility and separatism. 106 In that sense, the Rehnquist Court's movement toward color-blind equality recognized the importance of other values. It adopted substantive discrimination in its color-blind jurisprudence.
The Parents Involved plurality opinion, however, was entirely divorced from the Rehnquist Court's frequent mention of the specific harms of considering race. 107 This was true for the Parents Involved opinions by ("'[A] statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race.'" (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980)) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 (stating that racial gerrymandering "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes"); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence."); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) ("If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury.").
105. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 ("Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters."); id. at 338 ("By virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality, such students are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School's mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences."); Easley v. (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). These isolated statements should not be read as evidence that the plurality is concerned with something other than individual treatment. The plurality opinion, read in both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Additionally, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Fisher did not discuss any specific substantive values attending any equal protection jurisprudence. 108 Further, the Rehnquist Court at times permitted the consideration of race, while the Roberts Court in Parents Involved sought to eradicate all race-based decision making.
109
The Rehnquist Court's racial gerrymandering cases, for example, allowed the consideration of race, so long as it was not a predominant factor. 110 This was arguably the situation presented in Louisville and Seattle. Parental choice was the predominant factor, with some consideration of race.
111 Parents Involved strongly suggested, however, that any consideration of race in the districting process would treat voters differently because of their race and hence be unlawful. Perhaps even more notable was the Rehnquist Court's approval of the University of Michigan Law School's consideration of race in student admissions.
112 While the Roberts Court has not overruled Grutter's allowance of diversity as a compelling governmental interest, its requirement of a more rigorous narrow tailoring analysis in Fisher limits the practical reach of Grutter. its entirety, is clearly only interested in the impact race-conscious decision making has on individuals. The importance of individual treatment is what is driving the majority and plurality opinions-even though the challenged plans judged no applicant by merit.
108. The very brief majority opinion focused on reiterating the commands of Bakke and Grutter. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) . Its main point was the importance the judiciary undertaking a vigorous narrow tailoring analysis. See id. at 2420-21. In discussing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, Justice Kennedy recognized that universities attach educational value to a diverse student body. See id. at 2417-18 (mentioning "enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes"). Yet that recognition is quickly followed with the need for judicial narrow tailoring, and that analysis includes no mention of any substantive values associated with race-conscious activity. He further attacked diversity on its own terms: "racial mixing does not always lead to harmony and understanding," and "it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement." 115 Likewise, his concurring opinion in Fisher faulted affirmative action for setting up African-American and Latino students for academic failure. 116 Granted, Justice Thomas often makes more impassioned and detailed arguments than other conservative members of the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts. Yet, like the Rehnquist Court, Justice Thomas is concerned with more than the process of race-based differential treatment. He faults race-conscious activity for its association with other harms.
C. Parents Involved and Its Importance
One could argue that this Article makes too much of one opinion. The most controversial aspects of Parents Involved are found, after all, in a plurality opinion and not a majority opinion.
117
The conceptual impact of Parents Involved, however, cannot be doubted. The Roberts Court authored one of the central civil rights opinions of the twenty-first century by rethinking the central civil rights opinion of the twentieth century.
118 Given Brown's iconic status in American jurisprudence, not just civil rights jurisprudence, any opinion that touches upon Brown's meaning at length (as Parents Involved does) deserves significant attention. For that reason alone, Parents Involved, even if involving a plurality opinion, deserves careful reading for how it defines race discrimination.
Further, in the majority opinion, the Court defined the injury suffered 116. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432 (2013) . (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although cloaked in good intentions, the University's racial tinkering harms the very people it claims to be helping."); id. at 2431 ("Setting aside the damage wreaked upon the self-confidence of these overmatched students, there is no evidence that they learn more at the University than they would have learned at other schools for which they were better prepared. Indeed, they may learn less.").
117 123 In that opinion, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts, which are presently reconsidering the merits of the case.
Abigail Rose Fisher sued the University of Texas (UT) and other state defendants for considering race as a factor in undergraduate admissions.
124
The defendants admit using race as a factor, and argued that their racial considerations were entirely consistent with Grutter.
125
Most UT undergraduates are admitted via the facially race-neutral "Top Ten Percent Plan," whereby Texans graduating in the top ten percent of their high school class are guaranteed admission to UT. 126 Those outside the top ten percent (or attending a private school without class rank) are eligible for admission through a "full file" review that results in an AI/PAI score. 127 The AI, or Academic Index score, predicts a student's expected GPA freshman year by analyzing standardized test scores and evaluating high school class rank. 128 The PAI, or Personal Achievement Index, includes race. Specifically, the PAI is composed of three factors: two scores from the student's two personal essays and a student's personal achievement score (PAS). 129 The PAS is determined by six factors, one of which is "special circumstances."
130 Six factors make up the "special circumstances" score, and one of the six factors is race. 131 As described by the district court, race is "a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor."
132
The parties dispute the number of students who are admitted and enrolled "because of" their race. The plaintiff places the number of minority students admitted because of race at a total of thirty-three, out of a class of over six thousand. 133 The defendants contend the exact number is unknowable because race is never a single decisive factor. 134 They argue that the full file review, however, is significant in increasing the diversity at the UT-Austin campus. 135 They point out that twenty percent of AfricanAmerican admits and fifteen percent of Latino admits are offered admission after a full file review. 136 The Top Ten Percent Plan alone produces a great deal of student diversity. Before the PAS was changed to take into account race, AfricanAmericans and Latino students comprised more than twenty percent of the entering freshman class at UT Austin. 137 While the minority enrollment has increased to slightly over twenty-five percent since race became an admissions factor, most of the increase is very likely due to demographic changes in the state population. 138 The defendants argue that additional measures are necessary to produce actual classroom diversity, particularly in small classes. 139 The plaintiff in this case presently is only seeking the return of (nonrefundable) application fees totaling $100. 140 She has already graduated from Louisiana State University (LSU) and is not seeking any damages from attending LSU instead of UT.
141 Even more interesting, no one is arguing that she would have been admitted if she were AfricanAmerican or Latino. Even if she had gotten a perfect score on her PAS, UT claims she still would not have been admitted.
142
Fisher's claim is entirely process oriented-like the plaintiff's claim in Parents Involved. She argues that she suffered a constitutional injury from 133. See Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) racial attentiveness in an admissions system. 143 Her claim is actually weaker than that in Parents Involved because in that case the plaintiffs argued that they would have been admitted if they were minority students. 144 Ms. Fisher, on the other hand, is not making that argument. The district court and Fifth Circuit rejected Ms. Fisher's claim and upheld the UT plan as entirely consistent with Grutter.
145
The Supreme Court accepted review of the case. 146 Many predicted the Roberts Court would revisit (and likely revise) the holding in Grutter given the departure of its author, Justice O'Connor. 147 After months of speculation, the 7-1 opinion instead took a decidedly moderate approach.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy vacated the Fifth Circuit's opinion upholding the UT admissions decisions. 148 The majority did not consider Grutter's approval of diversity as a compelling governmental interest because Ms. Fisher did not specifically challenge it. 149 Instead, the Court determined that the Fifth Circuit had been too deferential to the defendants when holding that the consideration of race was narrowly tailored to the quest for diversity. Specifically, the Court counseled that the judiciary itself must make a searching inquiry into whether "available, workable race-neutral alternatives" would provide the educational benefits of diversity. 150 A school must use race-neutral means if they work "about as well and at tolerable administrative expense."
151
Fisher was far from groundbreaking; it relied heavily on precedent and , 2012) , http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/supreme-courtdivided-over-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions/2012/10/10/152ace2a-125e-11e2-be82-c3 411b7680a9_story.html ("At the end of a lengthy oral argument over admissions policies at the University of Texas, it seemed highly unlikely that a majority of the justices would announce a ringing endorsement of racial preferences."); Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factor at Universities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/ us/a-changed-court-revisits-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions.html ("By the conclusion of the argument, it seemed tolerably clear that the four members of the court's conservative wing were ready to act now to revise the Grutter decision.").
148. Grutter was notable for its deference to educators and its cost-benefit analysis 153 when it determined that diversity could be a compelling governmental interest and approved the law school's admission policies.
154
Fisher instead required no deference to educators. 155 In fact, Fisher is similar to Justice Kennedy's dissent in Grutter where he criticized the majority for its lack of rigor in its strict scrutiny analysis. 156 In Fisher, he was able to undercut those parts of Grutter that counseled deference and approved the actual mechanics of a plan.
157 Diversity remains, but with the proviso that Justice Kennedy made in his Grutter dissent: narrow tailoring should mean something-a searching inquiry is necessary.
158
The shift away from deference to educational defendants makes judicial acceptance of an affirmative plan far less likely. The UT defendants will have a difficult time proving that race is "'necessary' . . . to achieve the educational benefits of diversity." 159 The Top Ten Percent Plan already produces significant diversity, albeit not at numbers reflecting graduating Texas seniors. 160 Yet the plan likely works "about as well" and is "available."
161 Further, the small number of minority students admitted through the race-conscious program indicates that the race factor is not necessary for diversity, 162 particularly given Parents Involved's reasoning that the small numbers affected in that case indicated a lack of need.
163
Grutter's deference to the university defendants was also inconsistent with Parents Involved's command to eradicate racial attentiveness in government decision making. 164 By definition, a true color-blind approach mandates careful narrow tailoring-it is part of the formula to limiting the address the disparate impact of a selection procedure or test and not be guilty of disparate treatment. 171 The defendants refused to certify test results for promotions within the New Haven Fire Department, in part out of a fear of a disparate impact suit given the racially disparate test results. 172 The plaintiffs in turn sued the defendants for disparate treatment, arguing they were treated differently because of their race when the defendants refused to certify the test results. 173 The Court held that an employer needed a strong basis in evidence that it would be subject to liability for a disparate impact claim to avoid being subject to a disparate treatment claim for disregarding test results or discontinuing a selection device. 174 That evidence was absent in Ricci. The city instead had only the racial impact of the test results, which did little to prove potential disparate impact liability. 175 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the defendants violated Title VII's disparate treatment prong when they refused to certify the test results.
176
Like Parents Involved, racial attentiveness in the decision-making process indicated discriminatory intent and a constitutional injury. 177 The injury arose from the process of considering race. Like the plurality decision in Parents Involved, but unlike Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved, the majority in Ricci provided no context for why the New Haven defendants chose not to certify the racially disparate test results. 178 Instead, the majority focused on the lack of individual (2010) ("That the Ricci majority worked so hard to reach its result suggests that the racial trigger for the tests' reconsideration doomed that action in its eyes, regardless of the legitimacy of the city's concerns about the tests' validity."); id. at 203 (" [T] he Court for the first time characterized a public employer's attention to its practices' racially disparate impact as evidence of its discriminatory, and thus unlawful, intent."); id. at 229 ("The Court now, however, appears to treat a decision maker's attention to the disparities experienced by members of traditionally subordinated racial groups . . . as inextricable from an intent to discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to demand justification.").
178. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[A]s the part of the story the treatment because of racial attentiveness to the disparate test results in the decision-making process.
179
Granted, Ricci and Parents Involved concerned different types of constitutional injuries. The plaintiffs in Parents Involved indicated no harm other than the process of considering race and the disappointment of being denied enrollment at a preferred school, which previously had no constitutional dimension or importance. 180 The plaintiffs in Ricci claimed the additional harm of not receiving promotions, which has long been accepted as a cognizable constitutional injury.
181
Yet Ricci is technically not a promotion case. The plaintiffs were never entitled to a promotion; the test results making them eligible for promotions were only valid if certified, and the defendants had refused to certify the results. Rather than decide that the plaintiffs lost their promotion rights, the majority argued that the plaintiffs prepared for the test in reliance on the test being certified. 182 The reliance efforts in preparing for the test were a sufficient injury.
183
Both Ricci and Parents Involved strongly adopted a color-blind approach to discrimination law out of an exclusive concern with individual rights. Like Parents Involved, Ricci relied on the impact that racial attentiveness had on individual rights, 184 without balancing those concerns with other values as the Rehnquist Court did in its race discrimination jurisprudence. 182. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583-84 ("Examinations like those administered by the City create legitimate expectations on the part of those who took the tests. As is the case with any promotion exam, some of the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and personal commitment in preparing for the tests.").
183. Id. at 584; Norton, supra note 177, at 247-48 ("The Ricci majority's heavy weighting of the reliance interests impaired by disappointed promotion expectations [indicates that the Court may have] expanded its understanding of the costs to nonbeneficiaries that are sufficiently weighty to trump the benefits of achieving antisubordination ends.").
184. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578-79, 585, 592-93 (describing the injury entirely in terms of the impact on the individual); see also Areheart, supra note 177, at 995 (noting the majority's focus on the individual and the dissent's focus on the group).
185. See supra Subsection I.B. 186 In sum, like Parents Involved, Ricci was a stronger commitment to color-blind jurisprudence than previously seen and that commitment arose out of exclusive concern with individual rights. It, too, signals a shift.
Despite its importance, Parents Involved should be restricted to its holding: applying the Equal Protection Clause's strict scrutiny to claims of race discrimination. Given the different levels of review afforded to sex and other discrimination claims, Parents Involved should only be applied to instances of race discrimination. 187 And although statutory and constitutional claims are treated almost identically, the Court should confine the Parents Involved decision to the constitutional realm of discrimination law.
188 That is, a case would require a state or federal actor to implicate Parents Involved's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. ; see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (predicting that "the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later"); id. at 625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority "shows little attention to Congress' design or to the Griggs line of cases Congress recognized as pathmarking"); Areheart, supra note 177, at 993 ("The Ricci case held, for the first time, that an employer's attention to disparate impact against some may in fact be evidence of its disparate treatment of others."); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 177, at 107 ("Treating the City's racially attentive analysis under disparate impact law as a form of intentional discrimination per se not only represented a departure from Title VII law but rewrote antidiscrimination law in an unequal way."); Norton, supra note 177, at 225-26 ("The majority's premise that Title VII's disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions are potentially antagonistic thus departs dramatically from the assumptions of the Griggs Court and Congress that attention to employment practices' racially disparate impact remains entirely consistent with and complementary to Title VII's objective in ensuring equal employment opportunities for all.").
187. 
The Victims When Discrimination Is Only Process
Making racial attentiveness in governmental procedures a constitutional injury greatly expands the field of potential plaintiffs. Parents Involved suggested that all students of all races would have a cause of action against the school districts for schools' consideration of race. 190 All students were subjected to a racialized student assignment process, and this is the extent of the constitutional injury.
Moreover, Parents Involved strongly implied a cognizable injury exists even if students (of any race) were admitted to their preferred school so long as the defendants considered race in that process. 191 This situation obviously would raise questions of jurisdictional standing. The Supreme Court in Parents Involved reasoned, however, that a plaintiff would still have standing in this situation: "[O]ne form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff . . . ." 192 Thus, the possibility of a future injury satisfies standing. 193 Making the injury available to all racial groups, however, avoids the problem identified by Professors Cheryl I. Harris and Kimberly WestFaulcon in their analysis of Ricci. Professors Harris and West-Faulcon argue that the Ricci Court created an injury available only to whites, who in that case were complaining that the fire department did not certify the results of a promotion test. 194 Yet instead of "whitening" discrimination, which Professors Harris and West-Faulcon observe in Ricci, perhaps the Roberts Court in Parents Involved was erasing any racial component from discrimination. In theory, that would mean discrimination would have no racial content at all. This is an ironic result for an antidiscrimination command adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War, but consistent with the Roberts Court's quest to erase race from decision making. 195 
Future White Plaintiffs
After Fisher, Ricci, and Parents Involved, white plaintiffs will have an easier time proving illegal discrimination in their reverse discrimination cases. By definition, all race-conscious decision making includes race in its process; that makes intent a nonissue. Further, strict scrutiny is not very forgiving of any race-conscious activity. What counts as a compelling governmental interest has always been quite limited, and Fisher bolstered the strength of the narrow tailoring analysis. Racial attentiveness by government actors will be relatively easy to attack through the legal process. That is certainly the intended result of Fisher, Ricci, and Parents Involved. In this sense the opinions accomplished what they intended.
Do the opinions, however, have unintended consequences for nonwhite plaintiffs? The difficulty with applying Parents Involved to traditional discrimination claims is determining discriminatory intent, which is the topic of the next Part.
II. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED
This Part turns to the impact of Parents Involved on minority plaintiffs claiming race discrimination. Specifically, this Part reveals how Parents Involved's process-only injury makes it slightly easier for these plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent.
A. Discriminatory Intent
All Equal Protection Clause claims require proof of discriminatory intent.
196 A state worker contesting her firing under the Equal Protection Clause, for example, must prove that the defendant's discriminatory intent motivated the termination.
Defining Discriminatory Intent
Discriminatory intent means that the defendant took action "because of" the plaintiff's race or other protected status. 197 In the context of white plaintiffs complaining of race-conscious government action, the connection between a defendant's action and a plaintiff's race is rarely at issue. The defendant usually admits race consciousness, and defends on the ground of compliance with the strict scrutiny standard. For example, the defendants in Parents Involved acknowledged that their policies had a racial component and defended (unsuccessfully) the policies on the grounds that their pursuit of diversity was constitutional. 198 Minority plaintiffs challenging ostensibly race-neutral standards face an entirely different situation. A fired state employee, for example, would claim she lost her job because of a supervisor's discriminatory intent, despite the state's racially neutral standards for continued employment. Few defendants, if any, would respond by admitting a connection between their actions and a plaintiff's race. Instead they typically respond by contending race did not motivate the firing and the plaintiff deserved to be fired for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. That response puts plaintiffs in the position of proving that the defendants actually did have discriminatory intent, despite their protestations to the contrary.
At its most fundamental level, discriminatory intent means acting with "[a] purpose to discriminate" 199 and not merely the disparate impact of a practice or policy. 200 Discriminatory intent is more than an awareness of consequences, but instead acting with desire to cause the results. 201 Yet, and with some contradiction, animus or some sort of bad motive is unnecessary. 202 Discriminatory intent may be subtle 203 or unconscious 204 and still be actionable. 205 Thus, a fired plaintiff can prove that the firing was motivated by her race, even if the defendant did not realize it was firing her because of race and did not consciously want to discriminate. 206 Discrimination need not be the main or only intention behind the challenged action. Instead, the protected status must at least be "a motivating factor" for the defendant's actions. 207 Thus, an employee states an actionable Equal Protection Clause case (called a "mixed-motive" claim) when a legitimate factor such as tardiness motivated the firing, but so did the worker's race. If tardiness were the sole reason, however, the firing would not be because of the employee's race.
Professor Martin J. Katz criticizes the motivating factor standard as requiring too small a causal connection. 208 Yet the recognition of a motivating factor as sufficient proof is more of a normative decision than a causal one. The standard recognizes that discriminatory and nondiscriminatory impulses can (and often) coexist, and that the discriminatory impulse should still be actionable even if legitimate reasons exist as well. 209 Further, the law limits the available remedies when the plaintiff proves that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor for the action but the defendant proves that they would have still made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff's race. For example, the defendant found to have fired a worker both because of race and tardiness can defend on the ground that the tardiness alone would have resulted in firing. In that situation, no remedies are available under the Constitution, 210 and Title VII only allows injunctive relief and attorney's fees. 211 
Proving Discriminatory Intent
Proving the discriminatory intent of a facially neutral employment practice has rarely been simple. 212 One reason is access to proof. Defendants have unique access to their states of mind-and can easily hide that information. Defendants rarely admit, "I am firing you because of race." 213 Government actors and employers quickly learned to hide their intentions behind race-neutral justifications. In addition, defendants may not even be aware of their "true" intentions. 214 As a result, plaintiffs typically lack direct evidence of discriminatory intent.
Given the paucity of direct evidence, most plaintiffs rely on circumstantial proof. 215 The most common practice in employment discrimination cases is comparing how similarly situated persons were treated. 216 For example, were white workers fired for being late, or only the tardy African-American employees? The problem with comparators is not the theory, but the reality. Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg thoroughly documents that the workplace seldom has the necessary comparators. 217 In practice, the judiciary is far from willing to conclude that circumstantial evidence in fact proves discriminatory intent. 218 This is consistent with psychological studies documenting people's hesitance to label actions as discriminatory. 219 Professor Michael Selmi makes a compelling argument that "the Court consistently fails to find discrimination unless it is overt; subtle discrimination continues to elude the Court's understanding of intentional discrimination." 220 The lack of direct evidence and the treatment of circumstantial evidence leave most plaintiffs challenging race-neutral practices unable to prove discriminatory intent. 221 
B. Parents Involved and Discriminatory Intent
Earlier this Article argued that Parents Involved expanded the definition of constitutional injury. 222 After Parents Involved, racial attentiveness in the decision-making process is a constitutional injury itself, without proof of any substantive harm. This section explores how that change in conceptualizing discrimination affects the meaning of discriminatory intent. 223 
Expanding the Definition of Discriminatory Intent
Discriminatory intent requires, of course, attention to what will and will not count as discrimination. Parents Involved thus changed not only what is meant by discrimination. It also changed discriminatory intent. Courts must now also recognize disparate treatment in any processes when examining discriminatory intent. In other words, a court must adjust the definition of discriminatory intent to capture any racial attentiveness in the process of decision making. Only then will courts achieve Parents Involved's goal of eliminating all instances of different treatment based on race. 224 Thus, the issue of intent after Parents Involved is not just whether the worker was fired because of race, a significant evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs. 225 The question now must also capture whether the process of firing differed by race. The impact of this expanded definition on defining constitutional injury and the attending remedy is discussed below. 226 The definition of discrimination after Parents Invovled does not, however, cure the substantial problems of proving a defendant's discriminatory state of mind, even with the opinion's definition of processonly discrimination. The absence of direct evidence of discriminatory intent and the limitations of the available circumstantial evidence remain.
Coexistence of Discrimination and Nondiscrimination
Parents Involved signifies a second shift in discriminatory intent: discrimination and nondiscrimination can, and do, coexist. 227 In reverse discrimination cases, the Court has found discrimination, even if nondiscriminatory motivations were present as well. 228 In both Ricci and Parents Involved, the defendants considered legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors in their decision-making process. 229 In Ricci, the defendants were also concerned about the validity of the promotion test and the need for effective leadership. 230 In Parents Involved, the defendants valued parental choice and school capacity. 231 The Court did not allow the nondiscriminatory impulses in either case to excuse or invalidate the discriminatory impulses.
232
Yet the opposite often occurs in the facially race-neutral context. Here, differing versions of why something happened compete with each other at the proof stage-one causal set of discriminatory reasons versus another causal set of legitimate reasons. This happens because the absence of legitimate factors often proves the intent to discriminate.
233
As explained earlier, plaintiffs usually only have access to circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent. 234 The reason for a defendant's actions and their connection to the plaintiff's status is rarely proved, however, with direct inferences. The law is rarely able to infer from circumstantial evidence X, Y, and Z that the defendant discriminated, as the law can infer from skid marks the speed of a car's travels.
Rather, a defendant is frequently unable to prove a legitimate reason applied in a nondiscriminatory way. When that occurs, the law allows a finding of discriminatory intent. 235 Thus, discriminatory intent is frequently demonstrated by the absence of legitimate reasons for the decision. Excluding all legitimate reasons to prove the illegitimate one is obviously a difficult evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs.
Another difficulty for plaintiffs is that the presence of a defendant's legitimate reason is often taken as excusing the presence of an illegitimate reason. This is most notable in employment discrimination cases. (1973) . The test includes four elements: "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. " Id. absolute color blindness. 246 This Part also recognizes, however, that these injuries will likely result in more limited remedies. 247 
A. A Truly Color-Blind Concept of Injury
At times, plaintiffs produce evidence of explicitly racial conduct, and the law excuses it. After Parents Involved, however, that must change. Chief Justice Robert's concept of color blindness-his command that "the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race"-compels a prohibition of all racial actions. 248 The Court's concept of discriminatory injury must therefore now recognize the illegality of all racial actions.
Racial Harassment
Racial harassment claims often arise in the workplace, and such cases are typically decided under Title VII's prohibition against different treatment.
249 If the claim involves state action, the plaintiff may also file suit under § 1983 for the Equal Protection Clause claim. 250 Apart from the state action requirement for § 1983, the substantive standards are the 250. For examples of cases in which public employees produced evidence of racial comments and other harassing conduct by their public employers but failed to establish that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to make a successful claim, see Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that allegedly racist comments by supervisors were too sporadic to be considered pervasive); Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that coworker comments had only a tenuous connection to the plaintiff's race and national origin and were not sufficiently severe to establish a Title VII claim); Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining that allegedly racist supervisor comments were not sufficiently severe or pervasive because they were not made directly to plaintiff, but rather heard secondhand); Smith v. Northeastern Illinois University, 388 F.3d 559, 566-67 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that her work environment was objectively hostile within the meaning of Title VII because supervisor remarks, while clearly racist, were not directed at her); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that two allegedly racist supervisor comments, made more than six months apart, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a Title VII claim); and Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268-70 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that supervisor and coworker comments were too vague to establish an objectively hostile work environment). Professors Pat Chew and Robert Kelley found that plaintiffs win less than half of their cases. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 249, at 87 (finding a 33.3% success rate "when defendants use ostensibly race-linked physical objects (such as nooses or Ku Klux Klan-associated attire)" and a 25.9% success rate with "race-obvious verbal harassment (such as the use of [n-----]).").
same. 251 The racial harassment must be unwelcome and either pervasive or offensive (both of which are judged by an objective and a subjective viewpoint). 252 It can include both obviously racist treatment and more subtle racist treatment. 253 The current racial harassment standard thus excuses employers from any responsibility for racial slurs and racist objects in the workplace if they are welcomed or not severe or pervasive from either an objective or subjective viewpoint. That approach permits racial attentiveness to continue-racial slurs and racist objects are often "allowed" because they do not rise to the level of actionable racial harassment.
Parents Involved suggests a different analysis when state actors are sued for racial harassment involving blatantly racist activity by either supervisors or coworkers. Then the line of inquiry would not be welcomeness, pervasiveness, or offensiveness, but instead whether plaintiff at any point was treated differently as an individual because of race. 254 Under Parents Involved, the degree of pervasiveness and offensiveness is a question of damages and not a question of liability.
Racial (1982) . Yet when the employer is a municipality, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a policy or custom of allowing the challenged action to state a § 1983 claim. Patterson, 375 F.3d at 226.
The suits also differ in terms of the doctrine of respondeat superior. None exist for § 1983 claims. Id. Under Title VII, an employer can assert an affirmative defense that the employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and [] that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998 very likely occur if the racial slurs or racist objects were directed toward someone of the race or affiliated with the race the slur or object seeks to demean. 255 For example, a white man would very unlikely be targeted with the term "Boy" to demean his race, while the opposite would likely be true for an African-American man. 256 The same applies with racially charged objects such as nooses. Racial slurs and objects involving a perpetrator and victim of the same race would count as well.
This application of Parents Involved to racial harassment claims is contrary to the idea that employment discrimination law should not establish a "civility code" in the workplace. 257 Yet that is the consequence of Parents Involved when it sought to scrub racial attentiveness completely from government decision making. By equating the actions of the Seattle and Louisville school districts with de jure segregation, it created a standard that all state actors should always treat all persons without regard to race. 258 Chief Justice Roberts established a strict version of color-blind treatment and thereby compelled that a workplace be completely free from treating individuals differently because of their race. No racial statements or objects would ever be allowed; if they were, different treatment based on race would be permitted.
Note, however, that the question of employer liability for the racial harassment actions by employees remains after Parents Involved. 259 Employers can still defend on the grounds that they took reasonable remedial steps in response to harassment the employer knew or should have known about. 260 That is an issue of vicarious liability-not injury, meaning. 279 The Supreme Court has proved willing and able to declare whites the victims of discrimination, in the name of color-blind justice. Judicial recognition that minorities still suffer from different treatment as well presents a more accurate picture of the presence of race-conscious activity.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court's commitment to color-blind jurisprudence is stronger than any previous Court's, including the Rehnquist Court. It has defined white plaintiffs as victims of race discrimination when the process of decision making treated them differently because of their race, apart from any other attending substantive injury. That expanded definition of injury should have important consequences for minority plaintiffs as well. While it eases a bit the high burden nonwhite plaintiffs have of proving discriminatory intent, Parents Involved should provide additional constitutional protections in proving injury.
